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I THE EARLY YEARS 
Hugo Lafayette Black was born in east central Alabama's 
l Clay County. This section of the state was poor country and 
poor man's country. The white man did the farming for him-
self with little help from anyone. While Black's family was 
in the upper financial group, most of his friends and neigh-
bors were poor working people. 2 
Hugo Black's ancestors were mostly Scotch-Irish. 3 
William Black was born in Alabama in 1848. Martha Toland 
Black's ancestors did not arrive in the United states until 
the early l800's when her family came to the United States 
during the Irish rebellion. 4 William Black supported his 
family by storekeeping and sharecropping. 5 
Hugo was the last and eighth child born to Martha and 
1Birmingham News, July 23, 1967, p. 3. 
2charlotte Williams, 
cial Process (Baltimore: 
37-38. 
Hugo L. Black: A study in the Judi-
The John Hopkins Press, 1950), pp. 
3Max Lerner, "Hugo Black: A Personal History," Nation, 
CXLV (October 9, 1937), pp. 367-368. 
4John P. Frank, Mr. Justice Black: The Man and His Opin-
ions (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), pp. 3-4. 
5Newsweek, x (August 21, 1937), p. 7. 
William Black. 6 The Blacks at this time lived in Harlan, 
Alabama, where Martha was the postmistress. She had a great 
influence on all the Black children because she was greatly 
interested in education and because she encouraged the chil-
dren to read and improve themselves. 7 
2 
The Black family moved to Ashland when Hugo was three 
years old. This move was made because the Blacks felt that 
the children needed to be near a school. Here again, William 
Black set himself up as the local storekeeper. 8 
Hugo had an easy childhood. Like most children, he had 
to work for his spending money; he received no regular allow-
ance.9 Hugo did most of his work for a local newspaper, 
working as a typesetter or folding the newspapers.
10 
During 
Black's years in Ashland, he followed the county lawyers 
around, bombarding them with questions. Hence he became 
11 
known as the "courthouse pest." Hugo attended school in 
6Daniel M. Berman, "Hugo L. Black: The Early Years," 
~c_a_t--'h--'o_l_i--'' c~U~n"'i~v--'e--'r~s~i--'' t~Y~~L~a~w~R~e_v_i_e_w, VI I I (February, 19 5 9 ), p . 10 7 . 
7 Frank, op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
8Birmingham News, January 31, 1937, p. 2. 
9 ' 
Ibid. 
lOirving Dillard, one Man's Stand for Freedom: Mr. 
Justice Black and the Bill of Rights (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1963), p. 6. 
11Birmingham News, September 5, 1935, p. 1. 
Ashland and graduated from a local school called Ashland 
College. 12 
In clay county, Black had many friends who were the 
very poor. His association with these people led him in an 
understanding of their problems and a sympathy toward them 
that affected his entire political life. 13 
When Black was seventeen years old, he entered the 
Medical college of Birmingham. He did not desire a degree 
3 
as a doctor; 14 however, his older brother was in medicine and 
his mother had ambitious hopes for her youngest. 15 By the end 
of one year Black, with the aid of his brother, decided a 
medical career was not in the stars. 16 
The following fall, the future Senator entered school 
at the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa. Deciding to fore-
go the long formal education, he enrolled in the University's 
l2Newsweek, X (August 21, 1937), p. 8. 
13williams, op. cit., pp. 37-38. 
14Birmingham News, August 12, 1937, p. 1. 
15Mobile Press Register, August 13, 1937, p. 1. 
16"court: Roosevelt Takes out Judicial Insurance, En-
rages Foes, and Upsets an 'Immemorial Usage'," Newsweek, X 
(August 21, 1937), p. 8. 
17 two year law school. 
When Black entered the law school in 1904, it was a 
small school, with forty students and three faculty members. 
Since he had no pre-law preparation, he had a great deal to 
learn. He was able to buckle down to his various duties, 
and during his two years at the University, he was on the 
honor list of students. 18 
4 
In 1906, at the early age of twenty, Black graduated 
and entered the bar. 19 He then returned to Ashland and tried 
to build up a clientele, but without much success. About a 
year after his arrival in Ashland, the store over which he 
practiced law burned, destroying everything he owned includ-
ing a library which cost him $1,500. 20 So with no assets ex-
cept his education, the budding lawyer decided to return to 
Birmingham and practice law in the big city. His total assets 
at the time were less than ten dollars. 21 
17speech taken from the files of Hugo L. Black. The 
speech was given on March 20, 1926, at his home town of 
Ashland, Alabama. 
18
Birmingham Post-Herald, August 15, 1937, p. 5. 
19"rnvestigation by Headlines," Time, XXVI (August 26, 
1935), p. 15. 
20Raymond clapper, "Hugo Black: Nemesis of subsidy 
Spoilsmen," Review of Reviews, XC (August, 1934), pp. 18-20. 
21The New York Times, August 26, 1935, p. 2. 
In Birmingham Black prospered. On his arrival, he se-
cured a room which he shared with three other men. Next, he 
located an office which he occupied for two months. After 
these two months of little progress, he moved into an office 
across from the Birmingham courthouse.
22 
5 
Black was given his first real case by the lawyer from 
whom he was renting a desk. A Negro convict who had been 
leased to a steel company was forced to work fifteen days 
over time. 23 The young lawyer sued the steel company and won 
$137.50 for the Negro. 24 Among his clients were the Carpen-
ters' Union, and in 1909 he represented the coal Miners' 
Union. He represented the latter in their first Alabama 
strike. 25 His practice was far from outstanding but a grow-
ing reputation indicated a promising future. 
Four years out of law school and at the early age of 
twenty-five, Black won an appointment to the bench of the 
· . h 1 · t 26 . . h ' . d ' d t . 1 Birming am po ice cour. Birming ams rapi in us ria 
22"The Making of a Liberal," The Nation, CLX (January 23, 
1949), p. 131. 
23Birmingham News-Age-Herald, January 31, 1937, p. 3. 
24nillard, op. cit., pp. 7-8. 
25Max Lerner, "Hugo Black: A Personal History," The 
Nation, CXLV (October 9, 1937), p. 367. 
26The Atlanta Journal and Constitution Magazine, 
August 13, 1937, pp. 6-7. 
growth was based on coal and iron mining. Homicide rates 
were among the highest in the nation. 27 Black did not con-
sider his appointment to the police court to be of major 
significance, but at least he received some public recogni-
tion.28 
Since court convened only when it was necessary, Black 
used the remaining time for the practice of law. The de-
fendants that appeared were mostly vagrants, petty criminals 
~uch as opium addicts, wife-beaters, crap-shooters, and a 
faith healer who had victimized hundreds of Negroes. Many 
of those appearing before the court were Negroes. 29 The 
position called for little imagination or brilliance, yet 
young Judge Black surprised many Alabama residents with his 
understanding and his tolerance. He also showed impartial-
ity; he was always fair to the Negroes, treating them with 
the regard that all citizens deserve. 30 
6 
Black's administration was not without criticism. Many 
of his critics charged that he completed his docket too 
27williams, op. cit., p. 38. 
28speech taken from the files of Hugo Black. The speech 
was given March 28, 1926, in Birmingham, Alabama. 
29clapper, op. cit., pp. 19-20, 
30The New York Times, August 15, 1937, p. 2. 
7 
quickly. 31 The Birmingham Age-Herald reported that Black had 
disposed of 118 cases in about 150 minutes. He does not seem 
to have been a very lenient judge generally. Prohibition 
violators were shocked by$500 fines and ninety-day jail 
sentences; vagrants often received two-month prison terms. 32 
These sentences were criticized as being too harsh. 
The future supreme court Justice also showed that he was 
not a bigoted racist. In one case before his court, eleven 
Negroes were acquitted of disorderly conduct charges, al-
though a white officer had testified against them.3 3 In 
another, a Negro furnace worker was accused of having as-
saulted a\\hite installment collector. Black demanded to 
hear all the facts. Questioning disclosed that the collec-
tor had wanted to repossess the man's furniture. The Negro 
hnd informed the collector that his wife was sick in bed and 
d , d' h 34 had begge the white man not to isturb er. It was only 
when the collector insisted on taking the furniture that the 
Negro struck him. Black could not bring himself to condemn 
31Birmingham Post-Herald, August 15, 1937, p. 5. 
32Birmingham News-Age-Herald, January 25, 1912, p. 2. 
33stephen Strickland (ed.), Hugo Black: And the Supreme 
court a Symposium, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill company, 
Incorporated, 1967), p. 76. 
34scholastic, XXXI (September 18, 1937), p. 14. 
the worker. 
35 
He dismissed the case. 
Also in the years from 1910 to 1914, the young jurist 
carried on the practice of law outside of the police court. 
He handled a large number of labor and contract cases. 
36 
During this time, he developed a skill that was of great 
value to him in his Senatorial years. He became a skilled 
inquisitor. He developed the habit of the soft question 
which provoked a wrathful answer. By 1914, Black was earn-
ing about $7,500 a year. 37 
In 1914, Black ran for the office of county Solicitor, 
or county Prosecutor, in Jefferson County. After winning 
the election, he took office in December of 1914. 38 
8 
For the previous sixteen years, the position of Solici-
f f h db h ld b ' t fl' 
39 
tor o Je ferson county a een e y Harring on He in. 
The penal system at this time made it more profitable for the 
jailor to keep the prisoners in jail as long as possible be-
35The New York Times, ·August 15, 1937, p. 2. 
36Literary Digest, CXXIV (August 28, 1937), p. 11. 
37 "rnvestigation by Headlines," Time, XXVI (August 26, 
193 5) , p. 14 . 
38From the files of Hugo Black. A speech given in the 
Democratic campaign at Montgomery, Alabama. The exact date 
is unknown but it was in 1930. 
39Birmingham Post-Herald, August 13, 1937. (page unknown) 
fore their trial. During Heflin's administration, the court 
docket was packed with untried cases. 40 
9 
Black's principal campaign slogan had been to clean up 
the court docket and he and his two assistants set out to do 
just that. He was out to do his job well and to make a name 
for himself. 41 In Birmingham, the practice of keeping pris-
oners in jail as long as possible was profitable because the 
prisoners had to pay costs and the state paid fees which led 
to a tidy profit for the jailers. Black cancelled about five 
hundred of these cases. This caused talk of removing him 
from office.
42 
The Jefferson county docket had 3,238 cases pending. 
After Black and his assistants showed the people what could 
be done by energetic work, he was able to persuade the Gover-
nor and the Legislature of Alabama to provide additional help. 
With this help, he cleared the docket. 43 
After nearly six months as Prosecutor, Black began to 
notice a large number of confession cases coming from a sub-
urban town of Bessemer. The number of confessions, mainly 
40Berman, op. cit., p. 109. 
41Birmingham News, January 31, 1937, p. 3. 
4 2strickland, op. cit., p. 77. 
43nillard, op. cit., p. 57 
10 
Negro, from this steel and coal community ran higher than 
from any other area in Jefferson county. on his own, the 
county Prosecutor started to investigate. 44 Investigation re-
vealed that the Bessemer police department contained a 
"torture chamber" in which prisoners were beaten until they 
decided to confess, even if they were innocent. 45 
Black was faced with the problem of not knowing what to 
do. He was but a small time county official. Bessemer was 
an incorporated municipality, therefore, outside his juris-
diction. After much thought and deliberation he presented 
his evidence to a grand jury. 46 A report was then prepared 
for the county's criminal court. In Septembe4 1915, the re-
port was made public. It was startling: 
we find that, according to their own state-
ments, 0fficers ___ and __ __;have repeated-
ly been guilty of the practice of the "third 
degree" in a manner so cruel that it would 
bring discredit and shame upon the most un-
civilized and barbarous community. We find 
that a uniform practice has been made of 
taking helpless prisoners, in the late hours 
of the night, into a secluded room in the 
presence of these two officers, and others 
whose names we have not been able to obtain, 
and there beat them until they were red with 
their own blood, in an effort to obtain con-
44strickland, op. cit., pp. 78-79. 
45Birmingham Age Herald, September 18, 1915, p. 1. 
4 6Berman, op. cit., p. 110. 
fessions. We find that this cowardly 
practice, in which four big officers with 
pistols safely strapped on their bodies, 
would thus take advantage of ignorance and 
helplessness, has been continuously in opera-
tion for a number of years.47 
11 
Black pointed out that inhuman punishment and treatment 
was outlawed when the constitution was written. In a public 
message, he declared that the role of the police should be 
one of protector for all people. Furthermore, a person has 
the right to be treated as a human being even though he is 
charged with a crime or is guilty of a crime. 48 
For two months, an inquiry into the Bessemer situation 
was conducted in public hearing. The hearing committee was 
made up of three disinterested citizens. The citizen's com-
mittee published its finding in October of 1915. The Mayor 
of Bessemer was criticized, two altermen were asked to re-
sign, ,and four policemen were fired. 49 
During his years as county Prosecutor, Black tried a 
very large number of murder cases. The most controversial 
trial of this period was the Louis Walton case. Walton, a 
well known and respected businessman in Birmingham, was the 
47Birmingham News-Age Herald, September 18, 1915, p. 1. 
48Birmingham News-Age Herald, September 19, 1915, p. 1. 
4 9B irmingham News-Age Herald, October 28, 1915, p. 1. 
12 
principal shareholder in the Walton Trading company. The 
two other partners in his company were his wife and a long-
time friend, M. O. Barton. Each of the partners had a 
thirty-thousand dollar life insurance policy, payable to the 
firm in case of death. 50 On April 15, 1915, M. o. Barton 
was shot to death. 51 
Mr. Black, as Prosecutor, could find little evidence, 
but somehow he suspected Walton. Testimony revealed that 
Walton had been with Barton right before his death. Wal-
ton claimed that he and a friend had driven Barton out to 
see a girl friend. When Barton did not return at the ap-
pointed time, Walton and the friend returned to town. Wal-
ton's alibi was fairly convincing. Black's theory that 
Walton had committed the murder for money was very unpopu-
lar because most of the people in Birmingham felt that a man 
of his standing would not murder a friend for money. 52 
Black won an indictment on purely circumstantial 
evidence. During the succeeding trial, the following in-
formation was disclosed. The insurance policy on Barton was 
drawn up so that in the event of his death, ninety-nine per 
5°Frank, op. cit., p. 24. 
51Birmingham News-Age Herald, April 16, 1915, p. 1. 
52prank, op. cit., p. 25. 
13 
cent of the insurance money would be controlled by Walton 
and his wife, while on the other hand, if Walton or his wife 
died, only one per cent of the total insurance would be re-
ceived by Barton. It was further revealed that Walton had 
not made an initial investment into the business, therefore 
he had not used any of his money to start the business. 53 
Black theorized that Louis Walton had arranged the 
whole corporation simply for the accident insurance to be 
taken out on his friend, Barton. The jury divided, ten for 
conviction and two for acquittal. Before the trial could be 
scheduled for another time, Walton went to Atlanta where he 
took out life insurance. On the return trip, he blew him-
self to death with dynamite.
54 
Alabama was a legally dry state during Black's admin-
istration and he was against alcoholic excesses. When the 
question came up in his court as to whether the excise com-
mission of Birmingham could revoke the licenses of the whole-
sale dealers selling to illegal liquor salesmen, Black held 
that they could not. Nevertheless, he was always strong on 
the enforcement of the law prohibiting advertisement of 
53Birmingham News-Age Herald, August 10, 1915, p. 2. 
54Birmingham News-Age Herald, September 28, 1915, p. 1. 
14 
liquor on Sundays.55 
Black's vigorous and honest conduct of his office as 
Prosecutor won him many enemies. These enemies dedicated 
themselves to doing everything possible to embarrass him and 
his staff. 56 
In the meantime, world war I had begun. Black was very 
much opposed to the war and American entry. Nevertheless, 
he felt that if the United states entered the war, he must 
do his part to guarantee victory. He was above draft age 
but since he was single he enlisted. 57 
Black entered the officers training corps at Fort Ogle-
thorpe, Georgia. He served in the eighty-first Field Artil-
lery and as adjutant of the nineteenth Artillery Brigade. 58 
He spent one year tour of duty entirely in the United States. 
During this time he became an artillery captain, 59and when he 
was discharged, his promotion to major was coming up. 60 This 
55The New York Times, August 15, 1937, p. 2. 
56Mobile Press Register, August 13, 1937, p. 1. 
57williams, op. cit., pp.40-41. 
58Montgomery Advertiser, August 16, 1944, p. 4. 
59The Atlanta Journal and Constitution Magazine, 
August 13, 1937, pp. 6-7. 
6 0"Investigation by Headlines," Time, XXVI (August 26, 
1935), p. 16. 
year was spent at three different posts. His tour was 
rather routine. After the Armistice was signed, Black re-
ceived his discharge and returned to private practice in 
Birmingham. 61 
15 
After his return to Birmingham, his practice boomed and 
he became one of the most successful lawyers in the state. 62 
After his first three months of practice, he was able to buy 
an automobile on the profits.
63 
During this period he had 
very little to do with politics. 
Black was foot-loose and fancy free and well on his way 
to becoming an established bachelor when he met Josephine 
Foster at a dance in Birmingham. Miss Foster had attended 
Sweet Briar College. 64 She joined the Yeomanettes, the world 
war I women's naval auxiliary and she, like Black, spent the 
entire war in the United States.
65 
She had not received her 
discharge when she met Black. There were a few problems in 
the courtship. The Foster family was a little reluctant when 
61Birmingham Post Herald, August 13, 1937, p. 3. 
62
rrving M. Engel, "Justice Black After seven Years," 
The Nation, CLIX (October 7, 1944), pp. 404-406. 
63prank, op. cit., p. 32. 
64Dillar, op. cit., p. 9. 




for they regarded the young man 
with mixed emotions. They did not always agree with his 
political views. But in Februar½ 1921, shortly before his 
thirty-fifth birthday, he and Josephine Foster were married.
67 
Josephine and his marriage proved a great asset in the 
coming years. Mrs. Black was interested in the law and in 
her husband's political life, yet she never pushed him or 
tried to make him into something he was not. Her greatest 
ability, however, was in making her husband see the funny 
and happy side of every picture. Mrs. Black's great sense 
of humor contributed to their marriage by helping maintain 
a balance in his life. 68 
Both the Black's joined the American Legion Post. Mr. 
Black was, in fact, "a natural joiner."
69 
He became Chancel-
lor of Alabama's Knights of Pythias, an officer of his chap-
ter of the Masonic Lodge, and a member of civitan, Odd 
Fellows, Loyal Order of Moose, and the Pretorians. But the 
66Berman, op. cit., p. 111. 
67 "court: Roosevelt Takes Out Judicial Insurance, En-
rages Foes, and Upsets an "Immemorial Usage'," Newsweek, X 
(August 21, 1937J p. 8. 
68 Frank, op. cit., p. 33. 
69Montgomery Advertiser, August 16, 1944, p. 4. 
club that was spreading in Alabama in the 1920's was the 
Ku-Klux Klan. 70 
, 71 
Black's practice mushroomed from 1920 to 1925. His 
17 
practice seemed to be the usual of a liberal lawyer. He had 
some labor clientele. 72 By championing the cases of the work-
ing men of Birmingham, he prevented himself from gaining 
the business of the large corporations. 73 He represented the 
United Mine workers and other unions in a few cases. He was 
a very successful trial lawyer, winning ninety per cent of 
h ' 74 is cases. 
Hugo Black, like most lawyers, usually asked for large 
awards for his clients and surprisingly he was usually able 
to gain them. The jury found themselves so impressed with 
his voice and manner of speech that they gave his clients 
exactly what he demanded. As a lawyer, he became so well 
known for winning that he usually had to defend the lower 
70christian Science Monitor, XXX (August 20, 1937), p. 4. 
71williams, op. cit., pp. 41-42. 
72christian science Monitor, XXX (August 20, 1937), p. 4. 
73Birmingham Post-Herald, August 13, 1937. (page unknown) 
74Birmingham News, August 13, 1937, p. 4. 
18 
court's verdicts in a higher court. 75 
As his practice grew, he became more respectable and 
his opinion carried more weight. The local papers con-
sidered him important enough to quote his statements on all 
important matters. 76 The Birmingham Bar Association made him 
director and chairman of a committee to control ambulance 
chasing. In addition to teaching Sunday School, he kept 
active in lodge activities. Although not in politics, he 
was watching for a chance. 77 
One organization that many Alabamians joined in the 
1920's was the Klan. 78 This was the second Klan the South 
had originated. The original one, formed after the Civil 
war, was formed to retaliate against the scalawags and car-
petbaggers.79 world war I gave momentum to a new surge of 
the Klan in the South. "By 1926 it had about 85,000 members 
80 
in Alabama alone." 
75vincent M. Barnett, Jr., "Mr. Justice Black and the 
supreme court," The University of Chicago Law Review, VIII 
(December, 1940), pp. 21-22. 
76Birmingham News, January 31, 1937, p. 3. 
77Birmingham News, September 5, 1935, p. 18. 
78 
Lerner, op. cit., p. 367. 
79william P. Randel, The Ku-Klux Klan (New York: Chil-
ton company, 1965), pp. 1-10. 
80Berman, op. cit., p. 111. 
In Birmingham, the Robert E, Lee Klan Number One had a 
roster of ten thousand. 81 Many of Black's friends pressed 
him to join. At first he refused because he had so many 
obligations to other organizations. Ideological disagree-
ment had no significance. The Klan doctrine seemed to be 
19 
for the "common people" against the corporation and it also 
expressed some radical views toward Catholics, Jews, and 
Negroes. 82 In economically depressed areas, it asked for the 
curtailing of cheap immigrant labor and for higher wages. 
Most of the ideas appealed to the young progressive lawyer.
83 
On September 11, 1923, after deliberating for nearly a 
year, Black joined the Robert E. Lee Klan in Birmingham. 84 
The reasons for joining were simple. He was a poor man's 
lawyer and many of them belonged to the Klan. Furthermore, 
he was anxious for political advancement. 85 He remained a 
member until July 9, 1925. 86 During these two years, he at-
tended three or four meetings and delivered a few speeches 
81New York Times, September 13, 1937, p. 1. 
82Berman, op. cit., p. 112. 
83Lerner, op. cit., p. 367. 
84New York Times, September 13, 1937, p. 1. 
85The New Republic, XCII (September 29, 1937), p. 201. 
86strickland, op. cit., pp. 78-79. 
20 
which were carefully worded. While speaking of his friend-
ship for the Klan, he made no firm ideological commitment. 87 
Black's resignation from the Klan in 1925 was a friend-
88 ly one. The day after he ended his ties with the Klan, he 
announced his plans for running for the Senate seat of Oscar 
Underwood. 89 
The campaign was a long and vigorous one, even though 
senator Underwood withdrew soon after Black's announcement. 
There were five different men running for the Senate seat. 
Black was the youngest and he was not well known outside of 
Birmingham. Calling himself a candidate for the ordinary 
91 
people, he crisscrossed Alabama in a Model T Ford, paid his 
own expenses, and met the voters in every county. 92 The fol-
lowing is a portion of one of his handbills used in his 
campaign: 
Born on a Farm in Clay county 
Graduated Law University of Alabama 
8 7Lerner, op. cit., p. 367. 
88New York Times, September 13, 1937, p. 3. 
89The commonweal, XXIV (September 24, 1937), pp. 483-484. 
90Birmingham Post-Herald, August 13, 1937. (page unknown) 
91Literary Digest, CXXIV (August 28, 1937), p. 11. 
92"Black Scandal," Time, XCII (September 27, 1937), 
pp. 10-11. 
General Practice of Law Twenty Years 
Had been Judge city court, Birmingham, and 
Solicitor, Jefferson county 
Resigned as Solicitor and Served as Volunteer 
In Field Artillery world war 
Represented state Prosecution Girard Liquor 
cases 1916 
served Assistant Attorney General United states 
Prosecution Mobile Liquor conspiracy cases 
If Elected Will Take Office At Age 41 Years 
can Give to State Best Years of His Life If 
Elected93 
21 
In his opening speech given in his home town of Ash-
land, Alabama, he made many campaign pledges. He promised 
to help the farmer obtain cheap fertilizer as well as prom-
ising to work for higher wages and a restriction of immigra-
tion. He also called for lower tariffs and better roads. 94 
Black won forty per cent of the first place votes and 
enough second place votes to give him the nomination in the 
primary. In Alabama this meant he would win the election. 
On December 5, 1927, he took the oath of office as United 
95 
states senator. 
93Frank, op. cit., p. 40. 
94From the files of Hugo Black. A speech given in his 
home town of Ashland, Alabama, on March 20, 1926. 
95Birmingham News, December 5, 1927, p. 2. 
II INVESTIGATIONS 
Senator Black became the Senate's most famous inves-
tigator during his terms in office. His work earned him the 
nickname "The Ferret." 1 He would bring out his testimony by 
persuading those who took the stand that he already had the 
facts but merely wished to have them confirmed for the re-
cord. According to Raymond Clapper, Black "sits back easily 
in his chair, puffs slowly on his cigar, rolls his large, 
open eyes quite innocently, and with a wise smile undertakes 
to refresh the memory of a squirming witness."
2 
The Senator's first investigative duties were in han-
dling the Muscle Shoals section of the caraway inquiry into 
lobbying. This work developed his investigator's interest 
into the field of lobbying. He found that large companies 
were going to great lengths to influence the progress of the 
government for their own gain. 3 
1Birmingham Post-Herald, August 13, 1937, p. 3. 
2Raymond clapper, "Hugo Black: 
Spoilsmen," Review of Reviews, XXCIX 
Nemesis of Subsidy 
(August, 1934) p. 18. 
3 Irving Dillard, one Man's stand for Freedom: Mr. 
Justice Black and the Bill of Rights (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1963), p. 6. 
23 
In 1929, Black sought to investigate the economic af-
fairs of the United states Shipping Board, but his plans 
were blocked by the Republican majority. 4 Early in the year 
he held up an appropriation bill in a futile attempt to 
limit the salaries of the Shipping Board officials. 5 In 
September of 1929, the young Senator for the first time 
spoke against the practice of lobbying. He stated that all 
lobbyists should register and give the source of their em-
ployment and the amount of their funds. At this time, he 
called for an investigation of the entire field of lobbying 
and the methods used by lobbyists. 6 
After his re-election to the Senate in 1932, he 
sponsored a resolution to study ocean mail contracts. 
Black's measure was passed by the senate and he was made 
chairman of a special committee of inquiry. 7 In February 
of 1933, he again appeared before the Senate with a request. 
He asked that the Senate committee be authorized to investi-
4u.s., congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1929, LXX, 3620. 
5Ibid., 2540. 
6u.s., congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1929, LXXI, 3948. 
7charlotte Williams, Hugo L. Black: A study in the 
Judicial Process (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1950), 
pp. 37-38. 
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gate air mail contracts, also. In his oration, he emphasized 
the need for competitive bidding in the letting of mail con-
tracts.8 
On February 28, 1933, Senator Black succeeded in stal-
ling the signing of new mail contracts. These contracts, 
valued at more than ten million dollars, were up for renewal 
and were to be signed for a ten-year period. The Mercantile 
Marine's fleet was to receive them. 9 Senator Black intro-
duced a resolution forbidding the Postmaster General to 
award the contracts until there was further investigation. 
10 
The Senator's resolution passed. 
The Seventy-Second Congress created a special committee 
to carry out a thorough investigation of the mail situation. 
Senator Black became head of this committee. 11 As a first 
step to reform the mail system and prevent irregularities, 
he introduced a bill to regulate mail contracts and salaries 
of individual companies and corporations receiving government 
8u.s., congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1933, LXXVI, 3660. 
9 rbid., p. 4000. 
lOrbid., p. 4601. 
llu.s.,congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1933, LXXVII, 177. 
12 subsidies and government loans. 
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From Marc~ 1933 through the middle of JanuarY, 1934, the 
Black committee held public hearings. 13 The committee 
subpoenaed lawyer, William P, Maccracken, to appear before 
them and demanded that he bring all files relating to ocean 
mail and air mail contracts. Maccracken appeared but he did 
not bring his files. He claimed the privilege of private 
communication between lawyer and client. Senator Black then 
asked the Senate for a warrant for MacCracken, and the war-
rant was promptly issued, along with a command to bring all 
pertinent information. 14 
On February 5, 1934, evidence was presented to the 
Senate to prove that the awarding of contracts had not been 
through competitive bidding and that certain illegal actions 
had occurred. 15 
The investigating committee, with the use of evidence 
presented by witnesses, were able to piece together the un-
12u.s., congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st sess., 
1933, LXXVII, 504. 
13u.s., congress, Senate, committee on Investigation of 
Air Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts, Hearings, 73rd Cong., 1st 
and 2nd sess., 1933-1934. 
14u.s., congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1934,. LXXVIII, 1899. 
15 rbid., p. 1904. 
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1 f 1 t ' f th ' ' 1 ' 
16 
aw u ac ions o e air mai companies. Certain com-
panies met together in the office adjacent to the office of 
Postmaster General Walter Brown. These companies all 
carried mail for the United States Government. The meeting, 
conducted by attorney Maccracken, had as its first speaker 
Mr. Brown. After the address by the Postmaster General, the 
men were left alone to work out what routes a particular 
17 
company would be awarded. 
In speaking to the Senate, Black pointed out that this 
particular meeting was illegal because statutes of the 
United States prohibit combinations of prospective bidders 
for federal contracts. 18 Moreover, under law, any contract 
obtained by this method is invalidated. 
Under oath, Maccracken admitted that he was a represen-
tative of a number of airline contractors and that he atten-
ded the meeting in question. He still refused, however, to 
present his files to the investigating committee. The com-
mittee suggested that Maccracken send telegrams to his 
clients asking them to give the material to the Senate com-
16Birmingham Post-Herald, August 23, 1937, p. 2. 
17 . l U.S., Congressiona Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, 1904-1950. 
18rbid., p. 1904. 
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mittee. when Maccracken appeared before the committee 
again, he informed them that some of his files had been re-
moved.19 In his testimony, he mentioned two of his clients, 
a Gilbert Givven and a L. H. Britten. He accused them of 
removing personal f.iles from his office. The Black commit-
tee demanded to see these files; Maccracken again refused, 
and the Senate issued an instanter subpoena for the two to 
appear before the committee and to bring the files. 20 
Britten appeared but stated that he had destroyed the 
files because they were of a personal nature and he did not 
want them to come to the public attention. It was impossible 
to obtain these papers he mentioned. Nevertheless, he denied 
that they related to the ocean and air mail contracts. 21 
Givven, an employee of western Airways Company, had also 
removed material from the files of Maccracken but he re-
turned some papers the next morning. Givven testified that 
he had been directed to remove the documents by a Harris A. 
Hanshue, president of the Transcontinental and western Air 
Express. These papers, Givven said, were sent to the hotel 
19Birmingham News, August 12, 1937, p. 4., and u.s., 
congressional Record, op. cit., p. 1904. 
20u.s., congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, 1928. 
21u.s., congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, 1935. 
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of Hanshue. When the papers were returned and submitted to 
the committee, it was found that they related to air mail and 
other mail transportation. In stating that he had been 
directed to take the papers from Maccracken's files, Givven 
denied knowing of the Senate committee's desire to see them~
2 
When Hanshue, Britten, and Givven refused to cooperate 
with the committee, Black asked for and obtained a subpoena 
for the three men. The gentlemen were ordered to appear and 
to show cause as to why they should not be cited for contempt 
and fined. On February 9, 1934, the three appeared and they 
1 . d. 23 c aime innocence. Black's thorough interrogation, how-
ever, revealed that the letters supposedly destroyed by 
Britten all pertained to air mail contracts. The Senator pro-
duced copies of these letters and cross-examined Britten about 
them. One missive, written to Ben Myers, an employee of the 
Post Office Department, asked about extension of lines and 
d
. 24 
the awar ing of contracts. Black also presented copies of 
telegrams dealing with the conference instigated by Post-
master General Brown. Mr. Britten was an employee of North-
22u.s., congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, 1950-1955. 
23 rbid., 2098. 
24 rbid., 2205. 
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west Airway and the papers he removed were in the Northwest 
. f'l 25 Air Express i es. 
Senator Black, on February 10, 1934, called the Post 
Office inspector to the stand. He testified that he and two 
o·.:her inspectors went to the basement of 1090 National Press 
Building, which housed Britten's office. The inspectors 
went through three hundred gunny sacks of waste paper and 
were able to secure, for the Senator, letters that Britten had 
torn apart and thrown in the trash. 26 
A post office clerk testified before the investigating 
committee that he had burned government papers under the 
orders of Postmaster General Brown. 27 The ex-Postmaster 
then rushed to Washington and delivered to his successor, 
James A. Farley, two packets of correspondence dealing with 
contracts. Brown said he had found them among his personal 
f 'l 28 i es. 
After considering the evidence presented by the Black 
committee, the Senate found Maccracken in contempt and 
25u.s., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1~34, LXXVIII, 1912. 
26 rbid., 230-235. 
27The New York Times, January 20, 1934, p. 1, and U.S., 
Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1934, LXXVIII, 
4087. 
28Birmingham Post-Herald, August 23, 1937, p. 2. 
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sentenced him to ten days in jail~
9 
Britten was also found 
in contempt and given the same penalty. Both men appealed 
their sentences and were turned down. Thus, both served ten 
days in jail. 30 
on February 15, 1934, Postmaster General Farley an-
nulled all air mail contracts; 31 nevertheless, the contro-
versy continued, charges and counter-charges filling the 
. 32 air. 
Investigator Black, with expert skill, continued to un-
cover corruption in the Post Office Department. Paul Hender-
son, Vice President of United Aircraft, testified that the 
plan to prevent competitive bidding was entirely Postmaster 
General Brown's. 33 
John Coburn, President of the Aviation corporation, 
testified that Brown said, "I will not grant you any exten-
sion, I will not readjust your pay, until you agree among 
29"Investigations", Time, XXIII (February 12, 1934),p.54. 
30u.s.,congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, 2947. 
31 rbid., 2570. 
32The New York Times, February 17, 1934, p. 1. 
33u.s., congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, 7413. 
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yourselves how the mail will be carved up." Black main-
tained that not a single contract was given to any company 
that did not come to an agreement. 35 Further testimony 
proved that Brown arranged for an air mail contract to be 
awarded to central Transcontinental only if Trans-Atlantic 
Transport, western Air Express, and Pittsburgh Aviation 
corporation merged to form one large company. 36 
31 
In Apri~ 1934, senator Black had sufficient information 
to submit to the Senate the complete story about the "spoils 
conference" called by the former Postmaster General. Brown 
had tried to get the watres Bill passed to do away with 
competitive bidding. When this failed, he, at the urging of 
the large aviation companies, attempted to accomplish this 
another way by calling a meeting for the purpose of fixing 
contracts. 37 
The conference was held in May and June of 1930. Air 
mail companies met in the office next to Postmaster General 
Brown. The meeting was called at his direction and 
34u.s., congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, 7410. 
35 rbid., 7412. 
36 rbid., 4090, 
37 rbid., 7305. 
32 
Maccracken became chairman of the meeting. At the conclu-
sion of the conference, a report of the agreements was filed 
by Maccracken with the Postmaster under the date of June 4, 
1930. In the meeting, the conferees studied twelve routes 
and agreed to how seven of these should be awarded. The 
Postmaster "was to act as arbitrator in dividing up the air 
mail map. " 38 
Senator Black, in a public address, attacked the avia-
tion industry for its practices. The government, he main-
tained, had subsidized the aviation industry by paying 
private industry to carry mail. During the years 1928 to 
1938 the taxpayers paid over eighty-six million dollars to 
the industries and probably fifty-eight million dollars was 
paid as a subsidy. This did not include the cost of foreign 
air mail. Black charged that this money found its way into 
the hands of "profiteers" financial groups "who never flew a 
plane" or improved aviation. These groups control air trans-
portation and they can fix prices. At this time, the govern-
ment had awarded thirty-four domestic air mail contracts. 
Senator Black said that four parent holding companies con-
trolled twenty-five contracts; the Aviation corporation of 
38u.s., congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, 4613-4614. 
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Delaware controlled thirteen; the United Aircraft controlled 
six; the North American Aviation Company controlled five; and 
the Northwestern Airways controlled one. Ninety-seven per 
cent of all the money paid out by the government in 1932 went 
to these four companies. Black proved that these four com-
panies forced small firms out of business. The Senator 
urged Postmaster General Farley to cancel these contracts 
because his committee had proved holding charges against 
them. Hence, their contracts with the government were, under 
law, void. Senator Black lauded the courage of the present 
administration in acting against the fraudulent companies. 
The cancellation of the unlawful contracts would actually 
help the aviation industry, he concluded. 39 
The Brunner Bill was passed to authorize use of Army 
40 
Air Corps to carry the mail for one year. Unfortunately, 
the foul weather and poorly equipped planes brought much 
criticism to the new method of carrying the mail. 41 All 
newspapers carried news of the large number of crashes by 
the Army pilots carrying mail. Time Magazine managed to 
39The New York Times, February 17, 1934, pp. 1-3., and 
u.s., Congressional Record, op. cit., pp. 3178-3179. 
4 0The New York Times, February 25, 1934, p. 1. 
41 "Army Takes over the Mail," Time, XXIII (March 5, 
1934) , p. 46 . 
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convey the idea that Senator Black was responsible for the 
loss of lives because he led the investigation into the air 
mail irregularities. After the loss of ten lives, the domes-
tic air mail "stood stock-still while the Army knocked 
breathless ... caught its second breath."42 In ordering the 
Army to stop carrying the mail, 43 President Roosevelt sug-
gested to Senator Black that an aviation commission be set 
up to make an immediate study and recommend to Congress a 
broad policy covering all phases of aviation and the rela-
tionship of the government to the industry. 44 Franklin D. 
Rooseve1t then announced that for one year contracts would be 
let on a competitive bidding system. During this period, 
a broad policy relating to aviation as a whole should be 
45 adopted. 
Senator Black, in answer to President Roosevelt's 
suggestion, introduced a bill calling for a new aviation 
policy. Under his bill, contracts would be open to bids and 
the lowest bid must be accepted. All grievances concerning 
42 "Airmail," Time, XXIII (March 26, 1934) .p.53. 
43Franklin D. Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Random House, 1938), III, 
138. 
44 Ibid., pp. 183-184. 
45 Ibid., p. 184. 
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contracts would be made to the Interstate commerce commis-
sion and the decision of the commission would be considered 
binding.
46 
The bill also forbade free passes to congressmen 
on an air transportation system. The Alabamian argued that 
if a Senator accepts free passes for pleasure trips, he would 
then feel obligated to the company. This feeling would pre-
vent him from being objective about legislation affecting 
the company. This bill called for an entire cleansing of 
the industry. To do this, according to Black, the air mail 
should be taken away from the Post Office Department and 
placed under the Interstate Commerce Commission. 47 The bill 
proposed that a study be started, and upon expiration of the 
existing one-year contracts, the rates would be fixed by the 
Interstate commerce commission. These rates would be manda-
tory. The purpose of the Commission was to study the general 
subject of military and naval aviation and manufacturers so 
that a broad policy could be developed. 48 
In calling for the passage of this bill, Black made the 
following analogy: 
46u.s., congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, 6731. 
47 Ibid., 5694. 
48 Ibid., 7523. 
"There is no difference between the man 
who breaks open a store and takes twenty-
five dollars worth of goods and the man 
who, by chicanery and trickery, deprives 
the Government of the United states the 
rights to get its services at the lowest 
price by agreements with other men to pre-
vent honest, open, and fair competitive 
bidding. ,, 49 
The Senator's bill to regulate aviation and to allow 
the Interstate Commerce commission to determine rates for 
· 50 the carriage of the mail was passed. 
36 
The investigation into the aviation industry and the re-
sulting bill saved the United States Government a substan-
tial amount. At the time of cancellation of the contracts, 
the average rate paid per airplane mile was thirty-seven 
cents. Under the bid system started April 20, 1934, the 
average rate per airplane mile was twenty-three cents. The 
annual cost of the service under the bids with one hundred 
per cent performance was $6,105,221. Even with additional 
mileage, the cost for the carriage of mail over all the lines 
did not go over ten million dollars; previously, the govern-
ment was spending twenty million dollars annually. This was 
a three hundred per cent profit for the airlines per year. 51 
49u.s., congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., 




Another phase of the investigation that got much atten-
tion from Senator Black was the International Merchant 
Marines. 52 Black gave the following information over the 
National Broadcasting companies: 
Since the beginning of the world war, the 
United States Government has spent approxi-
mately four billion dollars to build up an 
American Merchant Marine ... our ships sub-
sidized with the money of the American tax-
payer, have formed combinations with foreign 
ships fixing rates so high by such agree-
ments as to place additional burdens upon 
American farm, mine, and factory.53 
Senator Black's investigating committee issued a report 
that showed that huge subsidies paid by the government to 
build up a Merchant Marine had been diverted from that chan-
nel and were largely spent in high salaries, extravagant ex-
pense accounts, highly paid lobbyists, and huge dividends. 54 
Since 1928, the United states Government had contributed 
practically one billion dollars in mail subsidies and govern-
ment loans to shipping interests. He proved that one company 
started in the shipping business with five hundred dollars 
52"Hugo Black: Alabama Senator is Keen-witted Investi-
gator," Newsweek, II (November 11, 1933),p.17. 
53 speech from the files of Hugo Black. The speech was 
given over NBC at the National Press Building in Washington, 
D.C. on January 24, 1934. 
54u.s., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, 7290. 
paid in capital. In a period of eight years, more than 
seven million dollars in profits had been made. 55 
38 
In MaY, 1935, Senator Black proposed that a minimum wage 
be paid to personnel on Merchant Marine ships. At the same 
time, he called for a limitation of profits for ship buil-
56 ders. Favoritism and waste over a period of years had re-
sulted in absolute failure to build up a strong Merchant 
Marine, he alleged. 57 
From January until May of 1935, senator Black worked 
for legislation in the Merchant Marine field. 58 His work 
resulted in a reform movement in the Merchant Marine and 
ocean mail contracts. 59 
In his investigations of the air mail and ocean mail 
situation, Black discovered other disturbing information. 
He found that the aeronautic companies were paying lobby-
ists as much as sixty thousand dollars a year to put pressure 
55u.s., congressional 
1934, LXXVIII, 7300. 
56 , l U.S., congressiona 
1935, LXXIX, 7446. 
57 b' 4 I id., 703 . 
Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., 
Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 
58 ' ' h t ld D mb 26 Birming am Pas -Hera , ece er , 1935, p. 10. 
5 9Birmingham News, August 23, 1937, p. 2. 
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on congressmen to get their contracts renewed. 60 In April, 
1934, he spoke out against lobbying. "It ought to be 
1 . ' t d d t l'k h · t ' d 
61 
e 1.m1.na e an cut ou 1. e a cancer, " e ma1.n a1.ne . 
From April until well into the fall, Black worked for 
passage of a bill calling for an investigation into all 
1 bb 
, . . . 62 
o y1.ng act1.v1.t1.es. A person had the right to inform 
Congressmen of his desires, but to lobby for any "greedy or 
predatory interest" is wrong, he believed. The lobbyist 
had spent over five million dollars in fighting the holding 
company bill. The public would pay for these activities by 
increased rates for gas and electricity. The Senate agreed 
and passed the Black Bill calling for a complete investiga-
tion into lobbying activities. 63 
Early in his administration Franklin D. Roosevelt com-
mitted himself to a program that would bring death to hold-
ing companies. Under pressure, however, he was persuaded to 
adopt a more moderate course. The Wheeler-Rayburn Bill was 
introduced to Congress with the so-called "death sentence" 
60u.s., congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, 7298. 
61Ibid. 
62The New York Times, July 11, 1935, pp. 1/4. 
63washington Evening star, August 9, 1935, p. 1. 
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provision, which empowered the Security Exchange commission 
after January 1, 1940, to dissolve any holding company which 
could not justify its existence. 64 The utility companies 
mounted heavy fire against the bill. "Lobbyists subjected 
congressmen to greater pressure than on any measure that had 
been before the House in years." 65 
In the midst of this situation, Senator Black and a com-
mittee of Senators started to work. According to the Ala-
bamian, there was "enough dirt to keep twenty committees 
busy." 66 A flood of telegrams and letters against the 
Wheeler-Rayburn Bill poured into Washington beginning in 
February, 1935. These messages, Black asserted, "did not ap-
pear on their face to have been written, prepared, or paid 
for by anyone but the person whose name was signed."
67 
How-
ever, evidence before the lobby committee showed that one 
holding company system expended more than $134,000 for tele-
grams and telephone messages. At an expense of sixty cents 
per message, this meant more than 235,000 messages were sent 
64 
Fortune, XXII (June, 1940), p. 156. 
65willial Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New 
Deal (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), p. 155. 
66 "The congress," Time, XXX (August 5, 1937), p. 7. 
67u.s., congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1935, LXXIX, 12771. 
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by this one company. Black proved that over 250,000 tele-
grams were sent by holding companies and five million let-
ters were sent under the same plan. 68 witnesses, under oath, 
disclosed the various methods used to send these telegrams. 
Some people were hired to obtain signatures and were paid 
for each one. Company managers of stores and places of 
business received general authority from their clerks, jani-
tors, and other employees to send messages. Holding com-
panies hired publicity men to prepare drafts such as the 
following to be sent: "Defeat the Rayburn-Wheeler Bill and 
you will get my support in the next election" or "I shall 
expect you to use your prerogative against the Wheeler-Ray-
burn Bill. As you vote now, so shall I vote for you at the 
next election." Furthermore, companies hired anyone with a 
friend in Washington to put pressure on that friend to per-
suade him to vote against the bill. 69 Congress buckled under 
all the pressure and refused to pass the bill. 
In reflecting on the defeat, Black charged that the lob-
by had "reached such a position of power that it threatens 
government itself. Its size, its power, its capacity for evil; 
its greed, trickery, deception, and fraud condemn it to the 
68u.s., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1935, ·Lxx:tx,, 12111-12113. 
69Ibid., 12773-12775. 
70 
death it deserves." 
Philip H. Gadsden, chief of the power lobby and chair-
man of the Committee of Public Utility Executives, came 
under fire from the Black committee.
71 
Black was able to 
42 
wring from Gadsden in his first questioning period the in-
formation that the power lobby had spent over one million 
dollars in the fight against the Public Utility bill. 
Gadsden claimed his constitutional rights to try to prevent 
passage of a bill that would destroy valuable property. No 
evidence was turned up to prove any illegalities. Neverthe-
less, Black still felt that fraud had been involved. 72 
The warren, Pennsylvania Representative of Associated 
Gas and Electric company admitted to some questionable acts 
in his fight to block the passage of the Public Utility bill. 
He had taken names from the telephone directory and signed 
them to hundreds of unauthorized telegrams and sent them to 
the congressmen. Black also summoned telegram men from 
Pennsylvania who testified that some two thousand anti-
"death sentence" telegrams in batches of one hundred had been 
70u.s.,congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1935, LXXIX, 12772. 
71Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: 
The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1960}, p. 318. 
72 "National Affairs," Time, XXVI (July 22, 1935), p.26, 
43 
sent by Associated Gas and Electric Company subsidiaries. 
Seven hundred had been signed by York street Railway company 
employees and their next of kin. If any employee objected, 
he was told to see the boss.
73 
Associated Gas and Electric Company had more than one 
hundred and fifty subsidiaries, associates, and affiliates. 
The two top men in the company at this time were Howard c. 
Hopson and James Mann. Senator Black, in an attempt to find 
out more about this company and to show benefits the company 
received from their lobbying, made plans to subpoena Hopson. 
Hopson, according to Senator Black, controlled and mapped 
out the entire program of propaganda for lobbying activities 
on the part of his men all over the country.
74 
On August 14, Black reported to congress that little 
progress had been made in the investigation of Associated 
Gas and Electric Company. Howard Colewell Hopson was sub-
poenaed on August 13. He declined to accept the summons, and 
his attorney, William A. Hill, physically prevented serving 
of the document. On August 14, another summons was issued 
and this one was served. Nevertheless, Hopson again refused 
73 "The congress," Time, XXX (August 5, 1935), Fl• 7. 
74u.s., congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1935, LXXIX, 13040. 
44 
to appear. 75 Finally, Black secured a warrant for Hopson's 
arrest. Faced with this challenge, Hopson appeared before a 
special session of senator Black's committee. Black prompt-
ly extracted testimony worthy of headlines. 
Mr. Hopson's reason for not appearing when first sub-
poenaed was given. He had deliberately arranged to be 
questioned by the House committee which was also conducting 
an investigation. He reasoned that the House investigators 
would be less grueling than their counterparts in the Senate. 
Next, Hopson admitted that in attempting to influence the 
press on the Public Utility bill, he had threatened to with-
draw advertising. Moreover, he conceded Associated Gas and 
Electric had paid more than five million dollars to four 
subsidiary companies in the form of service fees in 1930 and 
1931, to be used for lobbying.
76 
He went on to say that his 
company had spent around $900,000 directly against the Wheel-
er-Rayburn Bill and anticipated spending more. 77 
After the disclosure of the forged telegrams from 
Pennsylvania, Black found that telegrams were burned in a 
75u.s., congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1935, LXXIX, 13040-13041. 
76"National Affairs," Time, XXVI (August 26, 1935) ,p; 16. 
77 The New York Times, August 15, 1935, pp. 1/10. 
warren office. 78 A Hopson man had told the western Union 
office manager in warren that it would be a good idea if 
"somebody threw a barrel of kerosene in the cellar" 79 of 
45 
the telegraph office. The charred remains were found, how-
ever. Senator Black then issued a blanket subpoena for 
telegrams in the office of all companies in Washington. Ac-
cording to federal law, all telegrams are to be kept on file 
for one year. Immediately there arose a general outcry in 
the newspapers protesting the activities of the investigating 
committee. The Senator was accused of Nazi methods and 
abuse of freedom of speech and violation of the fourth amend-
ment to the constitution. 80 On March 5, 1936, Black appeared 
before the Senate and spoke about his methods. He quoted 
evidence already given that showed that before telegrams 
could be seized, Associated Gas and Electric company had their 
messages burned. He continued by pointing out that his com-
mittee had proved that a subsidiary of the Cities Service 
also destroyed their records on the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill. 
The only way he could secure copies of these telegrams, he 
78The New York Times, March 11, 1936, p. 1. 
79Leuchtenburg, op. cit., p. 156. 
SO,, Portrait 'The congress"', Time, XXVII (March 16, 
1936), pp. 17-18. 
asserted, would be to use a blanket subpoena. 
46 
81 
Hardy Strawn, a Chicago lawyer, sought to get an in-
junction restraining the telegram companies from furnish-
ing data to the committee. He charged that the committee 
work was just a general search. 82 Black retorted that his 
committee had "subpoenaed all telegrams of those gentlemen 
who conceal themselves behind organizations and groups in 
order to determine the policies of the nation behind a 
mask. n 83 Black pleaded with the court not to issue an in-
junction. In his oration, the Alabamian made the following 
remark: 
I will state very frankly that in my judg-
ment, if any judge ever issued an injunction 
to prevent the delivery of papers that were 
sought by this body through subpoenas, the 
congress should immediately enact legisla-
tion taking away that jurisdiction from the 
courts. Congress creates the jurisdiction 
of those courts ... If I had ever had any 
idea that any judge would issue an in-
junction against this body's getting cer-
tain evidence, I would long ago have intro-
duced a bill to take away the jurisdiction 
which enable the court to do that. 84 
81u. s., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1936, LXXX, 3328-3329. 
82The New York Times, March 12, 1936, p. 1. 
83u.s., congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1936, LXXX, 3330. 
84 "Portrait 'The congress'," Time, XXVII (March 16, 
1936), p.17. 
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The Court was unintimidated, however, and Mr. Strawn 
t d t 
. . t, 85 was gran e a emporary inJunc ion. Later, the United 
s·i:ates court of Appeals said that any evidence needed would 
be left to the discretion of congress. 
In defense of his committee, Black wrote an article 
that was published in Harpers magazine. The following excerpt 
indicates his views: 
There is no power on earth that can tear 
away the veil behind which powerful and 
audacious and unscrupulous groups operate 
save the sovereign legislative power 
armed with the right of subpoena and 
search. 
An investigation is a study by the govern-
ment of circumstances which seem to call 
for study in public interest. And the 
public hearing is usually, certainly in 
important investigations, preceded by a 
long period of extensive research. 
Unwillingness to answer questions, often 
under the unwise advice of lawyers, 
makes it necessary for committee investi-
gators to exam personal files and papers. 
Frequently the persons asked to reveal 
their papers protest earnestly that the 
documents in question are purely personal. 
It is amazing how much purely 'personal 
correspondence' there is in business files. 
I think it a fair estimate that Congres-
sional investigations are among the most 
useful and fruitful functions of the 
National legislature. 86 
S5The New York Times, March 12, 1936, p. 1. 
S6"Inside a Senate Investigation," Harpers, CLXXVII 
(February, 1936), 275. 
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Despite Senator Black's findings, on August 1 the House 
voted down the "death sentence" by a decisive margin. 
Through a compromise Black and Roosevelt won, however, for 
the final version of the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill wiped out all 
utility holding companies more than twice removed from the 
operating companies. It also empowered the Security Exchange 
commission, with whom all combines were compelled to regis-
ter, to eliminate companies beyond the first degree that were 
not in the public interest. The Commission, however, would 
have to defend an order of dissolution. Another section of 
the law authorized the Security Exchange commission to 
supervise financial transactions of the companies. 87 
Besides creating a permanent air mail service, Black's 
investigations also brought lobbyists under strict scrutiny. 
Moreover, his evidence helped in destroying the large hold-
ing companies because, under the new law, most of them would 
be destroyed in three years. 
87Leuchtenburg, op. cit., p. 156. 
III MUSCLE SHOALS 
The development of Muscle Shoals and the production 
of cheap fertilizer for the farmer were Senator Black's main 
interests in the Senate until the New Deal created the 
Tennessee valley Authority. During his first years in the 
upper house, he was usually quiet and did not orate on many 
issues; however, on the Muscle Shoals issue, he was always 
active.
1 
A main portion of his campaign for the Senate had 
been devoted to pledges for development of Muscle Shoals. 
The following is a portion of a campaign speech given by Mr. 
Black in Ashland, Alabama, on March 20, 1926: 
Everybody knows that cheap fertilizer 
means profit and prosperity to the farmer 
and that high-priced fertilizer means 
debt at the end of the harvest. we want 
cheap fertilizer and I am heartily op-
posed to making any private-owned power 
company a gift of Muscle Shoals. The 
people's money built it and it belongs to 
them. If you want your great property at 
Muscle Shoals given away to the Alabama 
Power Company, or any other privately 
owned power company, do not vote for me. 
God put it there for the benefit of all the 
people and all the people shall have it.2 
1Raymond clapper, "Hugo Black: Nemesis of Subsidy 
Spoilsmen," Review of Reviews, XXCIX (August, 1934), 18. 
2From the files of Hugo Black. A speech given on 
March 20, 1926, in Ashland, Alabama. 
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During World war I, a nitrate plant was built at Muscle 
Shoals. 3 After the war it stood idle. The Alabama Power 
Company, and later Henry Ford, wanted to buy this property. 4 
Hugo Black and Sena.tor Norris from Nebraska both worked con-
tinuously to keep this property for the people. Senators 
Black and Norris at first clashed in their desires, for 
Senator Black wanted cheap fertilizer and he felt the proper-
ty might be leased to private industry for this purpose. 5 
Senator Norris wanted the construction of a dam at Muscle 
Shoals to be part of a government project to distribute 
cheap electric power. 6 It took the senators about a year to 
come to a compromise solution. 
In one of Senator Black's first speeches before the 
Senate, he proclaimed that power was not what the farmer 
needed as much as he needed fertilizer. He said the farmer 
was deprived of a cheap fertilizer because Congress could not 
come to an agreement on a method of operating Muscle Shoals. 
3John H. Kyle, The Building of TVA (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1958), p. 8. 
4Judson King, The Conservation Fight (Washington, D,C.: 
Public Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 98-122. 
5Birmingham News, May 5, 1930, p. 4. 
6Richard L. Neuberger and Stephen Kahn, Integrity: The 
Life of George w. Norris (New York: The vanguard Press, 1937), 
pp. 204-206. 
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If Muscle Shoals would produce nitrates for fertilizer, the 
farmer could get fertilizer seven cents per pound cheaper 
than that imported from Chile. The Senator pledged his full 
support to any bill that would help get fertilizer for the 
farm lands. Furthermore, he did not believe that the sell-
ing of the plant to a private company would reduce the cost 
of power. 7 
Early in January, 1929, the new Senator went to work on 
the project. 8 In urging the Senate to support a new plant 
at Muscle Shoals, he asserted that "the government should 
control its navigable streams even to the extent of con-
structing power plants ... " 9 Shortly afterwards Senator 
Black proposed two amendments to the present Muscle Shoals 
bill. One provided for the building of an additional dam 
looking toward navigational improvements and increasing the 
available powers at the present dam; the other amendment was 
to give the President the authority to lease nitrate plants. 
This would separate the power plants from the nitrate plants. 
It further provided that if no private industry leased the 
7u.s.,congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1928, LXIX, 4101-4105. 
8u.s., congressional Record, 70th Cong. 2nd Sess., 1929, 
LXX, 2312. 
9Birmingham News, August 10, 1937, p. 5. 
52 
nitrate plants within three months, the government would then 
operate them and manufacture fertilizer as well as power. 10 
The Muscle Shoals bill was passed by the Senate and the 
House, but President Coolidge, through the use of the pocket 
veto, killed the bill. 11 In May, 1929, senator Black intro-
duced two new bills. One bill empowered the Secretary of war 
to execute a lease with Air Nitrates Corporation and Ameri-
can Cyanamid company for production of fertilizer. The 
second bill provided for the preservation, completion, main-
tenance, and the operation of the United States Muscle Shoals 
project for war, navigation, fertilizer manufacturing, 
electric power production, flood control, and farm relief.
12 
From May until October, Senator Black spoke out for aid 
to the farmer and proper use of the resources of Muscle 
13 
Shoals. On October 4, 1929, the Alabamian cautioned the 
Senate against renewing the contract with Alabama Power for 
exclusive use of electrical power from Muscle Shoals. Their 
contract would expire as of January 1, 1930. Alabama Power 
10 . l U.S., Congressiona Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., 
1929, LXX, 5591. 
11 b'd I 1. • , 1963. 
12Ibid., 1963-1966. 
13 "Real Federal Farm Aid Imperative," southern cultiva-
tion, II (October 15, 1929), p. 15. 
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controlled an exclusive contract with the government. Under 
terms of this contract, only one-eighth of the power that 
Muscle Shoals could generate was being put to use. Black 
was appalled at the obvious waste of power. Another argu-
ment for the use of Muscle Shoals by the government was based 
on the need for nitrogen in time of peace as well as in time 
of war. The United States, Black asserted, spends millions 
on battleships but does not produce necessary nitrogen. Ni-
trogen is imported from Chile, and the United states in 1929 
lagged behind all countries of the world in production of 
this item. According to information given by the freshman 
Senator, Germany, Great Britain, and Chile had a cartel 
agreement to control production and distribution of nitro-
gen. If Muscle Shoals, however, produced part of the nitro-
gen needed in the United States, the price of nitrogen could 
be kept down and the farmer would be able to purchase more 
needed fertilizer. Also, in time of war, importation of 
nitrogen could drastically raise the cost of war. This ex-
pense could be prevented by the use of a plant at Muscle 
Shoals which had been idle for nearly ten years. 14 
Into the spring of 1930, Black continually kept the 
question of Muscle Shoals before the Congress. He always 
14u.s., congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1929, LXXI, 4198-4209. 
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urged the operation of the nitrate plants for the benefit of 
American agriculture. 15 He was irrevocably opposed to turn-
ing this power over to Alabama Power Company or any other 
private company for exploitation and their own profit. 16 
On April 3, 1930, Senator Black offered an amendment to 
the bill pending concerning government operation of the plant 
in Alabama. His amendment provided for the construction of 
a third dam at Muscle Shoals to promote flood control and 
navigation on the Tennessee River. Senator Black fought for 
the construction of a nine foot channel all the way to Knox-
ville. Dam Number Three would be between Chattanooga and 
Florence. The Senator also supported the construction of a 
dam at Guntersville, Alabama. He reasoned that no private 
company would be willing to build a dam in this area because 
the company would not be able to produce electricity at a 
cheap enough rate to compete with other power companies in the 
South. Dam Number Three, according to Black, would open up 
navigation between Florence, Alabama, and Chattanooga, 
Tennessee, would increase trade and prove very beneficial to 
15Birmingham News, May 5, 1930, p. 4. 
16u.s., congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 
1929, LXXI, 4394. 
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these areas. 17 Black eventually decided to change the amend-
ment because many Senators felt that the expense of the oper-
ation would give President Hoover an excuse to veto the bill~
8 
A new resolution, offered jointly by Senators Black and 
Norris, provided for continued operation of Muscle Shoals and 
the building of a new dam at cove creek. This would bring 
navigation along the Tennessee River from Knoxville to the 
mouth of the river and provide storage dams and cheaper power. 
Their efforts finally achieved fruition when the Senate passed 
the bill. 19 
On June 28, 1930, Senator Black reported to the Senate 
that the Secretary of war sold about one-eighth of the power 
generated at Wilson Dam to the Alabama Power company. He 
refused to put the rest to use and therefore it was a com-
plete loss. When the plant was authorized, prohibitions had 
been made against making contracts to sell power exclusively 
to one company. Black argued that the power should be sold 
to municipalities. He accused the administration and the 
Republican party of being at fault. If power could be sold 
directly to municipalities, it would cause competition for 
17u.s., congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1930, LXXII, 6430. 
18rbid., 6438. 
19rbid., 6511. 
the Alabama Power Company. The company at the present time 
sold to municipalities at about twenty times the rate they 
20 
paid the government. 
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Senator Black reasoned that if this wasted power could 
be sold, it would mean increased revenue for the government. 
He proposed that the matter be submitted to the Judiciary 
Committee and an investigation be ordered to find out if 
Muscle Shoals power was being sold in accordance with law.
21 
The Senator's resolution passed and the investigation began. 
The inquiry proved that the power could be sold to more than 
one company and that large companies were using great sums 
of money to keep any legislation concerning Muscle Shoals 
from passing. Black then introduced a resolution demanding 
that the Secretary of war sell power to anyone until the 
government decided what to do with Muscle Shoals. The Secre-
tary of war was in charge of Wilson Dam because it was built 
for military purposes. The resolution was passed and the 
Secretary so instructed.
22 
The Muscle Shoals bill was finally passed by the House 
only to be rejected by the President. Black maintained that 
20u.s., congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1930, LXXII, 11965. 
21 rbid., 12384. 
22 rbid., 11764. 
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President Hoover vetoed the bill because of false information. 
The President said the cost of production of power at Muscle 
Shoals would be about nine and one-tenth mills per kilowatt 
hour. The Army Engineers, according to Black, fixed the cost 
of production at one and four-tenths mills per kilowatt hour. 
The engineers reported that electricity could be produced 
and transmitted three hundred and fifty miles at a cost of 
four and one-tenth mills per kilowatt hour. Power companies 
produced electricity and sold it wholesale for seven mills. 
The people paid about ten mills. These figures proved to 
Black that Muscle Shoals could compete with private companies. 
Hence, the President was mistaken in his reasoning. 23 
Black stressed how vital nitrates would be in time of 
war and warned that we depended on Chile and Brazil for our 
nitrates. on the other hand, Hoover, in his veto message, 
stated that the Secretary of war had informed him that there 
was no need for nitrates. Black went on to prove that in 
time of war we needed more nitrogen to make explosives. To 
substantiate his statement, he called experts to the stand 
to show that the United States was not self-supporting in 
time of war. In conclusion, the Alabamian charged that the 
Muscle Shoals measure was dying at this session of Congress 
23u.s., congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1931, LXXIV, p. 1951. 
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because the power companies, the fertilizer companies, and 
those who control the wealth of the nation wanted it to die~4 
Under the bill that President Hoover vetoed, the proper-
ty in Alabama could be leased but the company that leased it 
would have been permitted to make only eight per cent profit. 
The President would have had only one year to find someone to 
25 
lease the property. 
Black went on to say that the Alabama Power company was 
buying power at Muscle Shoals for two mills. Yet Hoover, in 
his veto message, said that it cost nine mills to produce 
electricity. Black maintained that if President Hoover's 
figures were correct, it meant that the Alabama Power Company 
was robbing the government. If this was true, their con-
t~acts should be cancelled immediately. 26 
The Senator reaffirmed his belief in private enterprise 
and stated that nothing should do away with private enter-
prise. Nevertheless, he felt that something had to be done 
to curb big businesses such as Alabama Power Company which 
were virtual monopolies. He felt that the Muscle Shoals bill 
would create more competition, and he asked that Congress 
24Birmingham News, March 4, 1931, p. 4. 
25 rbid. 
26Birmingham Post-Herald, March 5, 1931, p. 7. 
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pass the bill the next session over the President's veto. 27 
Through the next several years, Senator Black continued 
to work for the establishment of government control of Muscle 
Shoals and for the cheap fertilizer for the farmer. It 
seemed as if legislation of this kind could not be passed un-
til a new administration came to power; therefore, until the 
office of the presidency changed hands, Senator Black devoted 
much of his time to other things. 
When President Franklin D. Roosevelt came into office 
he immediately went to work to keep his campaign promise to 
do something for the people of the Tennessee Valley area. 
He consulted with Senators Norris and Black. The President 
revealed to Black and Norris that he envisioned a broader pro-
gram than theirs. Roosevelt's ideas were contained in one 
broad plan called the Tennessee Valley Authority. This mea-
sure passed and went into effect in 1933. 28 
The new agency, as a broad program of resource develop-
ment, was charged with constructing and operating a multiple-
use system of dams and reservoirs which would, besides im-
proving navigation, provide for flood control, generate a 
27u.s., congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1931, LXXIV, 1952. 
28u.s., congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess.,1933, 
LXXVII, 2633. 
60 
large amount of electric power, and give the farmers a chance 
to improve crops. 29 
29u.s. congress, The Tennessee Valley Authority Act 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 1. 
IV WAGE AND HOUR 
In 1929, after the crash and with the beginning Depres-
sion, Black began a study of wage and hour regulation as a 
method of ending economic decline and distress among workers. 
He was afraid of pump-priming as a method of getting money 
1 
down to the unemployed. He favored some direct relief, but 
he helped defeat a bill providing direct relief, the La-
Follette-costigan Bill, because it did not have provisions 
for state control.
2 
In December, 1932, Senator Black of Alabama introduced 
a new bill that would limit the hours of work in factories 
to thirty a week. 3 On January 23, 1932, President Green of 
the American Federation of Labor threatened a general strike 
if legislation of this type was not adopted. 4 At the same 
1Irving Dillard, One Man's Stand For Freedom: Mr. 
Justice Black and the Bill of Rights (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1963), p. 12. 
2Dillard, op. cit., p. 13. 
3Basil Rauch, History of the New Deal (New York: 
creative Age Press, Inc., 1944), p. 75. 
4Dexter Perkins, The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt: 
1932-1945 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 
p. 16. 
time, a committee of the Chamber of Commerce issued a "Re-
port on working Hours" recommending that a forty-hour week 
be adopted by industry, but only on a temporary and volun-
tary basis. The committee vigorously opposed any legisla-
tion on the subject. 5 
62 
The Black Bill barred from interstate commerce articles 
produced in plants in which employees worked more than five 
6 
days a week or six hours a day. In January of 1933, Black 
began to work vigorously for this measure. He repeatedly 
insisted that the bill would help destroy widespread pover-
ty. He cited the many attempts to bolster the economy such 
as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the attempts 
to balance the budget. He felt, however, that higher wages 
and shorter weeks were the most important, and he promised 
to keep calling for the measure until it passed. Senator 
Black made an appeal· to all interested people to appear be-
fore his committee and make suggestions.
7 
On February 17, 1933, Senator Black reported to the 
Senate on the findings made by his sub-committee. He gave 
5The New York Times, August 2, 1933, p. 1. 
6william Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 
New Deal (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1933), 
p. 820. 
7u.s., congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1933, LXXVI, 2740. 
the following reasons for passage of his bill: 
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(1) it would 
bring employment to six and one-half million people (2) it 
would aid the farmers and (3) by absorbing all these people 
into industry, confidence in the United States economy would 
be restored. Expert witnesses testified to the Senate that 
since the beginning of the depression, the number of hours 
worked increased greatly while wages decreased steadily. 8 
Business representatives constantly hoped to find 
reasons to defeat the Black Bill. One argument against 
passage of the bill dealt with constitutionality. These men 
claimed that regulating the hours of commerce should not come 
under interstate commerce; therefore, congress would have no 
jurisdiction over the matter. Senator Black responded as 
follows: 
Who can say with twelve million men un-
employed in America, with commerce 
between the states practically stopped, 
that the lack of purchasing power on the 
part of these people is wholly disconnec-
ted with interstate commerce? Who keeps 
up interstate commerce: The people of the 
United States when they cannot buy com-
merce perishes from the face of this na-
tion. It would certainly be strange and 
unusual to say that the congress of the 
United states can protect the people from 
a conspiracy to fix the price of goods, 
but at the same time cannot protect them 
8u.s.,congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd sess. 
1933, LXXVI, 4304. 
from conditions which are bringing 
death, starvation, misery, and destruc-
tion all over the land. 9 
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Senator Black told Congress that he would like a mini-
mum wage, but the court had ruled the minimum wage un-
constitutional. He claimed that labor was underpaid while 
capital was greatly overpaid. He continued by pointing out 
that goods cannot be sold unless people can afford to buy 
them. The Senator proclaimed that the Federal Government 
with reference to interstate commerce had "vested in it full 
and complete power. " He said that unless the hours of 
labor were reduced, it would be far more injurious to inter-
state commerce than anything so far guarded against. "It 
will destroy it and make it collapse."lO The states could 
regulate hours of labor in intrastate commerce, therefore, 
11 
Congress should have power to protect interstate commerce. 
When twelve million people are out of work and others work 
sixteen hours a day, it takes away the purchasing power of 
one-fourth of the people. commerce, therefore, must be pro-
tected from this evii. 12 
9u.s., congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1933, LXXVII, 1120. 
lOibid., 1123. 
11rbid., 1120. 
12 rbid., 1125. 
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On April 6, 1933, Senator Black proposed that an amend-
ment exempting all agricultural products and farm products, 
when processed for the first sale by the original producers, 
be attached to the bill. On the same day the Senate passed 
the amendment and the bill over great opposition.
13 
The House amended the bill. Chairman William P. Connery 
of the House Committee on Labor added a provision for a boy-
cott of imports produced by foreign industries whose labor-
14 
ers worked more than thirty hours a week. It seemed as if 
the House would pass the Black-Connery Bill. Under pressure 
from the business community, President Roosevelt appointed 
Secretary Frances Perkins to work out a substitute for the 
Black Bill. She suggested that a minimum wage provision be 
attached to the bill. Organized labor immediately approved 
the Black-Connery-Perkins Bill. The business community was 
15 
not mollified, however, and Roosevelt withdrew his approval. 
The President then appointed another drafting committee 
to come up with a solution to the labor problem. The new 
bill that Franklin Roosevelt presented to congress had some-
13 . l U.S., Congress1ona Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1933,LXXVII, 1346. 
14 rbid., 1424. 
l5Rauch, op. cit., p. 75. 
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thing for everyone. The business community had government 
authorization to draw up code agreements that v.ould be exempt 
from the antitrust laws; and labor received section 7(a) 
which guaranteed the right of collective bargaining and stip-
ulated that the codes should set minimum wages and maximum 
hours. The bill also provided for $3.3 billion in public 
16 works. This was the National Industrial Recovery Act. 
Senator Black opposed this bill and his group viewed it as 
a sell-out. 17 
When Congress met again in January, 1934, Black again 
introduced a bill dealing with hours of work. This bill 
limited the hours of service on common carriers engaged in 
interstate and foreign commerce to a six-hour day. His bill 
was referred to the commission of Interstate Commerce.
18 
All 
through 1934, Black worked for passage of his bill.
19 
In 1935, the Black thirty-hour bill came up for con-
sideration for the third time. 20 The bill had been expanded 
16Leuchtenburg, op. cit., p. 58. 
17The Nation, CXLV (August 21, 1937), pp.183-184. 
18u.s., congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1934, LXXVIII, 1441. 
19From the files of Hugo Black. 
by Mr. Black in New York on December 
An address delivered 
15, 1934. 
20u.s., congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1935, LXXIX, 1935. 
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until it covered at that time virtually all industries and 
all classes of wage earners. The Senate passed it again 
after much debate. 21 Senator Huey Long came to Senator 
Black's aid, along with many other liberals. Senator Long, 
claiming that the whole Senate was for the bill, argued that 
the National Recovery Act was no good and passage of the 
thirty-hour bill was needea.
22 
Senator Black stated that in order for a reduction of 
hours in industry to have the effect needed to bring about 
increased employment, two factors must concur. First, there 
must be a sufficient reduction in hours actually worked to 
make it necessary to employ additional people. Secondly, 
the bill must apply to as many working people throughout the 
nation as it is possible to reach by law. "Do away with the 
d 1 d t 1 t k . . t t . "23 o e an pu peop e o wor in priva e en erprise. 
Black denounced the National Recovery Act with the fol-
lowing oration: 
21 
I never have believed, and I do not 
believe that a matter virtually af-
fecting the lives and habits of the 
individual citizens of this nation; 
Rauch, op. cit., p. 184. 
22u.s., congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1935, LXXIX, 12800, 
23 Ibid., 12801. 
and which so vitally affects business 
enterprises in every section of the 
United states, should be left to the 
determination of any board vested with 
the power of life and death over a 
particular section.24 
The bill was again defeated in the House on April 8, 
1935. some of the opposition came from those who wanted to 
wait until the National Recovery Act was settled before 
, 25 
moving on the Black Bill. Black argued that the thirty-
68 
hour week bill should be passed even if the National Recovery 
Act was renewed. 26 
Again in 1936, Black worked for his shorter work week~
7 
He made use of a poll taken by the American Institute of 
Public Opinion to show that seventy-six per cent of the 
people who voted were for shortening the hours of labor at 
that particular time. He again stressed the need to choose 
28 
between the work and the dole. 
In March, 1936, Senator Black appealed to the public by 
24u.s., congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1935, LXXIX, 12802. 
25 
Rauch, op. cit., p. 185. 
26 Ibid., 5234. 
27 "Hugo Black: Alabama Senator is Keen-Witted Investiga-
tor," Newsweek, II (November 11, l933Y, P• .17. 
28u. s. 7 congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1936, LXXX, 5694. 
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writing a speech that appeared in The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science. In this publica-
tion, the senator gave the following plea for the shorter 
work week: 
Long hours and low wages ultimately 
lower the level of production, retard the 
improvement and expansion of the tools 
and machinery of output, close factories, 
cause the abandonment of mines, paralyze 
business, and bring about destitution 
and human suffering among helpless millions 
of people.29 
The Senator continued by noting that long work hours and 
low wages do not prove nor mean that production will in-
crease. Long hours and low wages, he insisted, actually 
lowers production in the long run. "The only way in which 
America's capacity to produce can be determined under our 
economic system," he continued, "is to supply sufficient pur-
chasers with enough money to buy the maximum output." 30 
Black concluded by stressing that unemployment was not in-
evitable and that the dole was character destroying. 31 
The article was well received by the people but the Black 
Bill was again defeated. Black, in June of 1936, neverthe-
29Hugo L. Black, "The Shorter work week and work Day," 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, CLXXXIV (March, 1936), 62. 
31rbid., p. 63. 
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less, predicted that a wage and hour bill would soon be 
passed because many people in the Democratic party had start-
ed calling for its passage, 32 
In May, 1937, for the seventh time Senator Black intro-
duced a wage and hour bill. 33 It soon encountered bitter 
opposition from southerners who wanted to maintain the "dif-
ferential" which enabled them to pay lower wages than other 
sections. 34 From Alabama came the proclamation that the 
people of all walks of life and every social degree were op-
posed to senator Black's wage and hour bill. According to 
the Alabama, the "bill is directly aimed against the south. 
The bill discloses the Senator's essential hostility toward 
industry as a whole ... and indifference to the industrial 
welfare of Alabama and its people." The Alabama charged that 
Black had ceased to serve the interest of the majority of 
Alabamians. In next year's primaries he should be "divorced 
from office in the interest of peace and common good,"
35 
South Carolina's Ed Smith, who was reported as saying that a 
32Birmingham Post-Herald, June 14, 1936, p. 5. 
33Rauch, op. cit., p. 287. 
34Leuchtenburg, op. cit., p. 261. 
35Alabama: The News Magazine of the Deep South, III, 
No. 31, (August 2, 1937,) p. 3. 
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worker could live comfortably in his state for fifty cents a 
day, fumed, "any man on this floor who has sense enough to 
read the English language knows that the main object of this 
bill is, by human legislation, to overcome the splendid gifts 
of God to the South." 36 
The bill, as introduced in May of 1937, by Senator Hugo 
Black and Congressman William P. Connery of Maryland, pro-
vided for minimum wages, maximum hours, and abolitQon of child 
labor. 37 On May 24, 1937, the President spoke to Congress 
in a special message and recommended acceptance of these 
principles in a Fair Labor Standards Bill. 38 Businessmen in 
the South put much pressure on the Congressmen to prevent pas-
sage of the bili. 39 
In June, 1937, Senator Black went again to the people in 
a speech made over the National Broadcasting Company. He 
called for an end to sweatshop conditions in industry and ex-
36u.s., congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1937, CLXXXI, 7882. 
37stephen Strickland (ed.), Hugo Black: And the Supreme 
court (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company; 1967), 
p. 44. 
38Franklin D. Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Random House, 1938), III, 
pp. 210-211. 
39Mobile Press Register, July 23, 1937, p. 4. 
72 
plained that his bill would do away with child labor and 
"privately paid strike breakers, labor spies, long hours, and 
unfair wages." The Black-Connery Bill would apply to the 
working conditions in non-agricultural industries whose 
products were transported across state lines or competed local-
ly with products from other states. The bill would not apply 
to the farmers. 40 
Opposition to the bill continued through the months of 
June and July. In July, senator Black again explained his 
position on the wage bill. He said that the proposed legis-
lation is but a modest beginning of a much needed effort to 
increase America's capacity to consume. "Such increase means 
increased production." The Senator goes on to say that the 
proposed legislation did the following: 
recognizes the practical necessities 
which make it possible to prescribe 
for all goods which enter into inter-
state commerce any single minimum fair-
wage standard or any single maximum 
work week standard •.. secondly, it 
deals with labor conditions only -- it 
has nothing to do with fixing prices, 
with trade practices, with production 
control and with monopolies. Third, 
all the wage and hour regulation is 
done by the government labor board it-
self -- not by private code authorities 
in the industry. Under the bill, one 
40Hugo L. Black, "The Wage and Hour Bill," Vital 
Speeches, III (June 7, 1937), p. 687. 
group in an industry cannot gang up on 
the others or run up expenses on the 
others.41 
senator Black also explained that the jurisdiction of 
the bill stopped short when workers' hours are reduced to a 
forty-hour week. Furthermore, the labor board would be in-
structed to put the new labor regulations into effect slow-
ly enough so that industry would not be dislocated and men 
thrown out of work in the process. Not only that, the new 
laws would be put into effect in such a way as to support 
collective bargaining. 42 
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The Senate approved the bill by the end of July and the 
pressure on the House members increased. 43 Finally, on May 
28, 1938, the House passed the measure. It became law in 
June, 1938. 44 
It provided for an establishment of a minimum wage of 
twenty-five cents an hour to be increased over seven years 
until forty cents minimum was reached. It provided for·a 
forty-four hour week to be reduced in three years to forty. 
41Mobile Press Register, July 23, 1937, p. 4. 
42Mobile Press Register, July 28, 1937, p. 1. 
43Mobile Press Register, August 13, 1937, p. 2. 
44Joseph G. Rayback, A History of American Labor (New 
York: The MacMillan company, 1959), p. 359. 
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Additionally, it provided for time and one-half for overtime. 
The employment of children under sixteen and under eighteen 
in hazardous occupations was prohibited. 45 
45Rayback, op. cit., p. 359. 
V CONCLUSION 
As a senator, Hugo Black was a liberal on economic 
issues. He concerned himself with problems like the de-
pression, the concentration of economic power, and the need 
to limit the work week. He was an enthusiastic and thorough 
investigator who served as chairman of several important in-
vestigating committees. During his last years in the Senate, 
he voted for nearly every issue proposed by Franklin Roose-
velt. This did not mean he was a "yes" man. His record 
shows that he was a pioneer in starting the more liberal 
trend in government and philosophically supported the New 
Deal. 
In 1933 and 1934, he started calling for Social Security 
and his work for government ownership of the property at 
Muscle Shoals was an indication of his progressive ideas. 
President Roosevelt nominated Hugo L. Black to the 
supreme Court in 1937. This nomination touched off a violent 
reaction in the Senate and in the nation. One factor behind 
the denunciation was a delayed reaction to Roosevelt's 
"court packing" attempt. Another factor behind the opposi-
tion was Black's constant support of the New Deal legisla-
tion during his ten years in the senate. But beyond any 
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question, the major cause for opposition was the disclosure 
that, in his early life, he had been a member of the Ku-Klux 
Klan. 
Black's life does indeed pose something of a paradox. 
There have not been many Southern politicians who end up 
championing Negroes and aliens, especially Southerners who 
belonged to the Klan and opposed immigration in their early 
life. 
But the paradox is not as strange as it may appear on 
the surface. The fact is that disregarding superficial ap-
pearances, there has been a continuity in Black's political 
thought. He has always been a critic of corporate wealth and 
power. He has always been occupied with helping to improve 
the life of the American worker. 
A desire to raise the wage level of the American laborer 
was one of Black's major objectives. As a freshman Senator 
he thought this meant preventing foreigners from entering the 
country and competing with native labor. However, it was 
only a matter of time until he abandoned this view and worked 
for a more basic method to insure American workers a better 
life. 
His membership in the Klan was used by Black as a vehicle 
for political reform and political advancement. His interest 
was in reform, not racist violence, and when he got what he 
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wanted from the Klan, he withdrew. 
It would be impossible for the writer to evaluate Black's 
career in a thorough way. It would be impossible to stamp 
his career as either "bad" or "good". His early life and his 
work in the senate both were parts of the development of a 
man. Neither justification nor condemnation would seem in 
order in dealing with any one stage of his career. It is the 
whole that should be judged. 
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